Update on landmark legal case against green energy developer

On the 21 and 22 April 2026, a hearing was held for the case of Natalie Barstow, the Campaign to Protect Rural Wales and The Land Justice Coalition (claimants) v Green Generation Energy Networks Cymru (defendants). Mark Burton, CLA Cymru adviser for planning and infrastructure, was present on both days of the hearing.

This is a judicial review into the conduct of Green Generation Energy Networks Cymru (GGC) in utilising survey powers under sections 172-179 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (the 2016 Act). These powers are used to access land to conduct surveys to prepare for compulsory purchase. The challenge was allowed to proceed on grounds including unreasonable and irrational use of the powers, use of powers beyond the scope of the law, improper handling of data and alleged breaches of Ms Barstow’s human rights.

While this case concerns Wales, the 2016 Act is a piece of UK legislation, so any precedents it sets will also be relevant to members in England.

On the first day the claimants’ legal team, laid out their grounds. Then on the second day the defence were permitted to respond, followed by a short period (in this case around 20 minutes) for the claimants to reply to the defence.

The claimants argued that GGC’s lack of policies on matters such as biosecurity avoidably harmed those they surveyed. The claimants alleged that there is a correlation between the spread of sheep scab and the movements of GGC’s surveyors. They also alleged that GGC’s surveyors’ conduct threatened protected sites, and protected species such as white-clawed crayfish. Photographic evidence was shared which the claimants say shows surveyors in visibly unclean clothing.

The defence argued that there was no legal obligation for GGC to have a biosecurity policy. The defence stated that in any case GGC did have one in place. This was initially the responsibility of individual contractors, only being codified more recently after criticism by the legal representatives of farmers affected by the surveys in question. The defence argued that the obligation under the 2016 Act for GGC to pay damages was sufficient protection for the claimants. The defence also argued that all evidence except that of Ms Barstow, the only named individual claimant, should be dismissed as it was factually disputed and the court may not rule on its accuracy.

The defence also argued that responsibility for limiting harm to protected species by GGC surveyors did not rest upon the claimants, but was a matter for enforcement bodies. They also claimed that the harm to the crayfish is not a criminal matter as it is “taking” them which is an offense, which refers to fishing.

It was accepted by both parties that GGC’s practice was to give notice for a long list of different types of survey over a protracted period of time, with surveyors then treating this as sufficient to access the land for any specified purpose as they saw fit throughout the period. The claimants questioned the legality of this practice. The wording in the 2016 Act is that surveys must be conducted at a “reasonable time”. The claimants argued that this should mean that notice is given for each individual survey, with some dialogue open about exact times and with GGC presenting three options on each occasion.

The defence responded that this requirement would seriously undermine the powers which parliament had elected to give acquiring authorities. The defence seemed to suggest that the claimants were requesting an outright veto on certain times by the occupier of property, although this seemed to me to be somewhat different to the claimants’ professed position. The defence also argued that the use of the power was not actually contingent upon the service of a notice. The notices’ purpose is as a precursor to legal action. 

Ms Barstow herself, a CLA member, claims a litany of negative interactions with GGC and their agents, culminating in a surveyor entering a SSSI watercourse containing protected crayfish when, she alleges, GGC told her this would not happen. This was deemed to be a breach of her rights to the protection of property and a private and family life.

The defence argued that the robustness of GGC’s activities was necessitated by the fact, they claim, the Barstow family did not engage constructively with them, a notion strongly disputed by the claimants. They also argue that the intrusion upon Ms Barstow was in fact minimal, and that her right to claim is limited by the fact that she does not own the property on which she lives. It is agreed that the surveyors did access the watercourse, but the defence argued this was an honest error and led to minimal disruption upon Ms Barstow as the watercourse is 250m from her house.

The claimants also alleged that GGC collected data unlawfully and shared it with group companies in breach of the conditions of their distribution licence (a permission from Ofgem to operate power lines, which also allows GGC to apply for compulsory purchase powers). The response of the defence was that data acquired unlawfully is not necessarily unlawful to process under the General Data Protection Regulations. This was followed by a 35-minute discussion of whether the parties’ legal costs of this particular ground are limited under a piece of international law known as the Aarhus Convention. This is an international treaty granting the public environmental rights, including access to information, participation in decision-making, and importantly here affordable legal challenges. It is the view of the claimants that it was already acknowledged by the defence that the ground does fall under the convention.

An interim judgement will be an given on 24 April on whether and to what extent a temporary limitation on GGC’s use of their survey powers may continue and also a clarification pertaining to the use of data. A full judgement will be given in due course.